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In this note we examine four standard multi−unit sealed−bid auctions in the presence of
synergy. The structure of the equilibrium bidding strategy under each rule is quite intuitive.
Whether the equilibrium involves "bundle−bidding" or "separating−bidding" strategy
depends on the presence of the "exposure problem" and the pressure of "demand reduction"
in each case. When the bidders can implicitly coordinate to avoid the "exposure problem"
and the pressure of "demand reduction," the equilibrium strategy can be calculated using
parallels with unit−demand auctions. However, in the presence of the "exposure problem"
well−behaved symmetric equilibria that can be characterized by the first−order condition of
bidders' maximization problem may not exist in at least some situations.
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More than two decades of research in single-object auctions notwithstanding, multi-
object auctions have been left relatively less explored. However, as observed recently,
even standard results from single-object auctions do not generally extend to the multi-
object case. Furthermore, there are certain issues that come up only in the multi-object
context making it necessary to develop a separate theory of multi-object auctions. In
this note we consider an auction for multiple units of an object and explore the bidding
behavior under diﬀerent sealed-bid rules in the presence of synergies.
In spite of the diﬃculties in obtaining closed form descriptions, some interesting pat-
terns have already emerged in the equilibrium bidding behavior of multi-unit auctions.
Noussair (1995), and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998a) considered multi-unit auc-
tions with each bidder having diminishing marginal values for two successive units. They
showed that under a uniform-price rule (with price equal to the highest-losing bid) bid-
ders tend to bid less aggressively on the second unit. This is the demand reduction eﬀect
of uniform-price auction. Tenorio (1997), and Ausubel and Cramton (2002) observed the
same phenomenon in more tractable models of multi-unit uniform-price auctions. The
intuition behind demand reduction is quite simple. Since the price is set by the highest
losing bid in the auction a bidder’s second unit can determine the price for the ﬁrst
unit. Therefore, rather than being competitive and drive up the price in the auction, in
equilibrium the bidders can implicitly coordinate to make low bids on the second unit,
thereby keeping the price for the ﬁrst unit low whenever it is won.
Katzman (1995), and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998b) looked into multi-
unit auctions as above under the pay-your-bid or discriminatory-price rule in which
a bidder pays the value of his bid for each unit won. In particular, they considered
symmetric continuous equilibrium strategies that can be characterized using the ﬁrst-
order conditions from the bidder’s payoﬀ maximization problem. They showed that
whenever there exists such an equilibrium it involves a bidder bidding more aggressively
on the second unit than on the ﬁrst. Thus in equilibrium bidders bid the same amount
on both units when the marginal values for the two units are close enough.
1In all these cases, a bidder’s value for the second unit is assumed to be less than that
for the ﬁrst unit. More recently, there has been research interest in auctions of objects
with synergies. Two 20 MHz nationwide radio spectrum licenses are often worth more
to the bidders than the sum of their individual values because of the richer uses to which
they can be put. Similar phenomenon is observed in many auctions for procurement
and construction contracts, as well. The diﬃculty of studying auctions with synergies
arises because a bidder who attempts to bid on the synergy may not win the bundle that
provides the synergy, and may settle for a collection of object that is worth less than
the price paid. This is called the exposure problem where in his eagerness to bid on the
synergy between objects, a bidder runs the risk of exposing himself to a loss that will
result if the bidder cannot win the desired objects at the end.
Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) described equilibrium bidding behavior and obtained
some comparative static results in multi-object auctions with single-object demand “lo-
cal” and multi-object demand “global” bidders. A global bidder’s values for the two
objects being superadditive. Menezes and Monteiro (2003), and Jeitschko and Wolfstet-
ter (1998) considered diﬀerent models of sequential auctions with positive and negative
synergies, and examined the equilibrium bidding strategies as well as the expected prices.
Kagel and Levin (2000) compared theoretical predictions and the bidding behavior of
human global bidder against computer bidders with single-unit demands in experiments
with sealed-bid and ascending-bid versions of the uniform-price auction. Katok and Roth
(2001) investigated the potential implication of strategic behavior by the bidders with
single-unit demands, as well, in a similar model by allowing all bidders to be human
subjects.
In this note we add to this line of work and study the bidding behavior in multi-unit
sealed-bid auctions where all bidders have multi-unit demands with variable synergies.
Standard sealed-bid auction rules diﬀer in whether there are pressures of demand re-
duction, and/or whether bidders can implicitly coordinate to get around the exposure
problem. We ﬁnd that the structure of equilibrium bidding strategies in these auctions,
if they exist, is quite intuitive.
22. The Model
A seller has K(≥ 2) identical units of an object on sale. There are n(≥ K/2) bidders with
bidder i having marginal values V1i for the ﬁrst unit and V2i for the second unit where
V1i ≤ V2i. We assume that the marginal values are continuous random variables with a
joint distribution function F(v1,v 2) and density f(v1,v 2) on the support 0 ≤ v1 ≤ v2 ≤ 1,
where (v1,v 2) is a realization of (V1i,V 2i).
Under all auction rules each bidder submits two nonnegative bids b1 and b2,a n d
the highest K bids are awarded the K units. Thus a bidder receives one or two units
depending on whether one of his bids or both his bids are among the K highest bids
in the auction. Assume, without loss of generality, that the bidding constraint b1 ≥ b2
holds for acceptable bids.
In a Vickrey auction a bidder who wins k units pays an amount equal to the k highest
losing bids of his rivals.1 In a discriminatory-price or pay-your-bid auction a bidder who
wins a unit pays precisely the amount of his bid for that unit. A single price for each unit
is established in the auction under each uniform-price rule. Under the low-bid uniform-
price rule the price is equal to the lowest-winning bid in the auction whereas under the
high-bid uniform-price rule the price is equal to the highest-losing bid.
A bidder’s strategy under an auction rule is a function b =( b1,b 2) that takes each
value pair v =( v1,v 2) to a pair of acceptable bids (b1(v),b 2(v)). Throughout this note we
consider symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria in pure strategies. We say that strategy b(v) is
in equilibrium if b(v) ∈ argmaxˆ b:ˆ b1≥ˆ b2 π(v,ˆ b) for all v where π(v,ˆ b) is a bidder’s expected
payoﬀ from bidding ˆ b =( ˆ b1,ˆ b2) when the other bidders follow the bidding strategy b.F o r
reasons of tractability we follow the aforementioned papers in multi-unit auctions, and
restrict ourselves to well-behaved equilibria where π is diﬀerentiable to allow a ﬁrst-order
condition characterization of an interior solution.
1This rule is the appropriate notion of a Vickrey (1961) auction in the case of multi-unit demands
with diminishing marginal values. However, when the marginal values are increasing then seeking
(nonincreasing) bids for the successive units, as in our case, does not allow the bidders to express their
true worths for the diﬀerent units. The only way that a Vickrey auction can be implemented in its true
spirit in this case is by seeking combinatorial bids for every possible package that a bidder may want.
Nonetheless, since we do not intend to discus combinatiorial auctions here, we continue to call it by the
same name in this paper.
33. Bundle Bidding Equilibrium
An equilibrium in an auction can involve one of two types of bidding strategies: With
a bundle-bidding strategy a bidder always bids the same amount on both units. With a
separating strategy while for some values a bidder could bid the same amount on the two
units, for other values the bidder submits a larger bid for the ﬁrst unit. The possibility of
equilibrium with separating-bidding strategies has already been observed in other multi-
unit auction contexts. Typically, such equilibrium strategies do not have closed form
expressions, and are generally characterized by ﬁrst-order conditions without guarantees
of existence (see Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn, 1998b).
We start by discussing the case of two-unit supply, i.e. K =2 . In this case if bidders
use bundle-bidding strategies a bidder either wins both units or none, thereby avoiding
the exposure problem altogether. On the other hand, pressures of demand reduction,
whenever present, prevent bidders from using bundle-bidding strategies in equilibrium
thus opening them up to the exposure problem, and making bidding on the synergies
diﬃcult.2 Proposition 1 identiﬁes the auctions where bidders can coordinate to bundle-
bid and those where they cannot. (All proofs are gathered in the Appendix.)
Proposition 1. Suppose that there are two units on sale. Vickrey auction, discriminatory-
price auction, and high-bid uniform-price auction have equilibrium in bundle-bidding
strategies while low-bid uniform-price auction does not have such an equilibrium.
In Vickrey and discriminatory-price auctions the second bid does not determine the
price for the ﬁrst unit. Therefore, the pressure of demand reduction is not present in
these auctions, and the presence of the synergies makes the bidders bundle-bid as a result.
Interestingly, unlike in the low-bid uniform-price auction, in the high-bid uniform-price
auction whether a bidder’s second bid determines the price for his ﬁrst unit depends on
whether the other bidders bundle-bid or not.
The auctions eﬀectively reduce to single-object auctions for the bundle under bundle-
bidding. Therefore, in equilibrium a bidder just splits the bid for the bundle into two
2We say that a bidder is bidding on the synergy at value (v1,v 2) with v1 <v 2 if a bidder’s bid on
the ﬁrst unit is greater than v1.
















|V1 + V2 ≤ v1 + v2].
It can be checked that in both the uniform-price auctions if the other bidders use
separating-strategies then the best response of a bidder is to use a separating-strategy.
This, of course, does not mean that the auction necessarily has a symmetric equilibrium
in separating strategies. In fact, it is possible to show that when bidder values are
uniformly distributed, the high-bid uniform-price auction does not have a separating
equilibrium strategy with a ﬁrst-order condition representation.
It is not diﬃcult to see that the above results carry over to any auction where each
bidder has increasing marginal values on M units, and kM units of the object are sold
for some positive integer k (<n ). Thus whenever bidders can implicitly coordinate to
eliminate the exposure problem and the pressures of demand reduction through bundle-
bidding, they will do so in an equilibrium.
In other situations, however, bundle-bidding cannot eliminate the exposure problem.
For concreteness consider the case where there are three units on sale (i.e. K =3 )a n d
each bidder has increasing marginal values for two units only. It is no longer the case that
with bundle-bidding bidders will either win both units or none. Thus there is no way that
a bidder can bid on the synergy without worrying about the exposure problem. Nonethe-
less, because pressure of demand reduction is absent in Vickrey and discriminatory-price
auctions (and in low-bid uniform-price auction under bundle-bidding), these rules induce
bidders to bundle-bid in equilibrium whenever there exists one.
Proposition 2. Suppose three units of an object are on sale. Under the Vickrey,
discriminatory-price, and low-bid uniform-price auction rules the best response of a
bidder is to bundle-bid whenever the other bidders are bundle-bidding. The high-bid
uniform-price auction does not have an equilibrium in bundle-bidding strategies.
When the other bidders use separating bidding strategies then the pressure of demand
5reduction reappears in the low-bid uniform-price auction since the second bid can now
determine the price for the ﬁrst unit. In other words, a separating bidding strategy is a
best response to other bidders using separating bidding strategies, making an equilibrium
in separating bidding strategies possible under both uniform-price rules.
Since bundle-bidding does not reduce the auctions to unit-demand auctions anymore,
like the previous case, equilibrium bidding strategies cannot be described by drawing
parallels with unit-demand auctions. In fact given the exposure problem an equilibrium
may not exist even under the relatively simple structure of the bundle-bidding strategy
as the following example suggests.
Example
Consider a Vickrey auction with K =3and f(x,y)=2 .I tc a nb ec h e c k e dt h a tw h e n
there are two bidders in the auction there is an equilibrium in bundle-bidding strategy
b1(v1,v 2)=b2(v1,v 2)=v2.
Thus bidders bid on the synergies in the sense that the bid on the ﬁrst unit is greater than
the value of the ﬁrst unit. However, this is a trivial situation because of the following
reason: In this case each bidder wins the ﬁrst unit for sure and because the ﬁrst bid does
not displace any rival bid, the payment on it is zero. The second bid displaces a rival bid
and it wins if the rival’s bid is less than his bid. This makes it almost like a single-unit
Vickrey auction for the second unit. The exposure problem is really not present in this
case, and a second bid (and hence also a ﬁrst bid) of v2 becomes a weakly dominant
strategy. In fact, just as the intuition suggests this fact is true for general distributions.
When n =3the exposure problem appears, and the derivative of a bidder’s expected
payoﬀ function when the other bidders use a bundle-bidding strategy is given by
2g(b)[(v1 − b)(1 − G(b)) + (v2 − b)G(b)]
where G(·) denotes the distribution of the joint (bundle-)bid for a unit by the bidders
and g(·) the corresponding density. If v1 <v 2, the expression is positive when b = v2,a n d
negative when b = v2. Thus the best response bid is between v1 and v2. Now consider
6the best response bid at (0,v 2) where v2 > 0. Observe that the above expression is
linear in the values, hence if a bidder makes the same bid at two pairs of values he
makes the exact same bid for all convex combinations of the values.3 Hence, if b is
the best response bid at (0,v 2), and since b is the best response bid at (b,b) we have
G(b)=v2b. Substituting this in the above expression the ﬁrst-order condition becomes
−b(1−v2
2) which is negative for all b>0. This implies that the corresponding ﬁrst-order
condition does not give an equilibrium strategy. Note, however, that this does not rule
out the possibility of bundle-bidding equilibrium strategy with a complex discontinuous
structure, for instance, or an asymmetric equilibrium.
4. Concluding Remarks
The exposure problem in multi-object auctions with synergies generally makes bidding
strategies diﬃcult to describe. Moreover, in multi-unit auctions often equilibrium sepa-
rating strategies cannot be described as closed form expressions. However, with synergies
possibility of separating strategy arises only if there are pressures of demand reduction
in the auction. Thus for a large number of situations the equilibria involve the relatively
simpler bundle-bidding strategy. In many cases bundle-bidding eﬀectively collapses the
auction into one where bidders have unit-demands for the bundle, and a ﬁnite number
of bundles are oﬀered on sale. However, in other situations a bundle-bidding equilibrium
strategy can become less trivial. As we demonstrated, a well-behaved bundle-bidding
equilibrium strategy may not even exist under the exposure problem. Nonetheless, equi-
libria in bundle-bidding strategies are easier to study. In fact, to what extent the ex-
istence and nonexistence of equilibria hold in multi-unit auctions under the exposure
problem appears to be a more tractable question to examine with bundle-bidding strate-
gies.
3See Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998a) for a similar construction.
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6. Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .Vickrey auction rule. Suppose bidders 2,...,n are bundle-
bidding. If bidder 1 bids b1 ≥ b2 his expected payoﬀ is
Z b2
0




where h(·) is the density of the highest of the rival bidders’ bids. The derivative with
respect to b1, (v1 − b1)h(b1), is positive if b1 <v 1, and similarly, the derivative with
respect to b2 is positive if b2 <v 2. It follows that bundle-bidding is the best response for
bidder 1.
Discriminatory-price rule. Suppose bidders 2,...,n are bundle-bidding. Denote by H(b)
the probability that the highest of these bidders’ bids is lower than or equal to b.
At a valuation pair (v1,v 2), with v1 <v 2, the expected payoﬀ to bidder 1 bidding
b1 ≥ b2 is
(v1 − b1)(H(b1) − H(b2)) + (v1 + v2 − b1 − b2)H(b2)
=( v1 − b1)H(b1)+( v2 − b2)H(b2).
The ﬁrst-order conditions4 for maximizing this with respect to b1 and b2 are given by
(v1 − b1)h(b1) − H(b1)=0
(v2 − b2)h(b2) − H(b2)=0 .
4Note that there is no corner solution to the problem.
9If at (v1,v 2) the best response b∗
1 is larger than the best response b∗
2 then at (v1,v 1) the


















This implies that at (v1,v 1) bidder 1’s best response is to bid (b∗
1,b 2) with b∗
2 >b 2.
Hence it is enough to prove that for any valuation pair (v,v) bidder 1’s best response
is to bid equal amounts. The ﬁrst-order conditions at (v,v) are given by
(v − b1)h(b1) − H(b1)=0
(v − b2)h(b2) − H(b2)=0 .
Thus bidding equal amounts is a best response at (v,v) and hence for all value pairs.
High-bid uniform-price auction. Suppose bidders 2,...,n are bundle-bidding. Let bidder
1 with valuations (v1,v 2) consider bids b1 ≥ b2. His expected payoﬀ is given by
Z b2
0




where h(x) is the density of the highest of the rival bidders’ bids, and the ﬁrst-order
conditions for maximizing this expression are given by
(v1 − b1)h(b1)=0
and
(v1 + v2 − 2b2)h(b2) − (v1 − b2)h(b2)=0
or,
(v2 − b2)h(b2)=0 ,
and the result follows.
10Low-bid uniform-price auction. Suppose bidders 2,...,n are bidding the same amount on
both units. Consider a valuation pair (v,v) for bidder 1 when v is less than the highest
joint bid made by the other bidders.
Bidder 1’s bid for the ﬁrst unit can only aﬀect his probability of winning this unit
and does not inﬂuence his price when he wins this unit.5 Hence he must bid v on the
ﬁrst unit. For the second unit he must bid v or less. He cannot have a second bid v since
that will give him zero expected payoﬀ whenever he wins. Hence his best response on
the second unit must be less than v. Thus we have proved that there is no equilibrium
where for every pair of values the bidder must bid equal amounts on both units. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2. Vickrey auction. Suppose bidders 2,..,n are bundle-bidding.
Let h(x,y) denote the joint density of the highest bidder’s and the second highest bidders’
bids (as opposed to the highest and the second highest bids that are equal in this case)

















The result then follows upon observing that the derivative of this expression with respect
to bi is positive if bi <v i, i =1 ,2.
Discriminatory-price auction. Suppose that bidders 2,...,n are bundle-bidding. Let
Hi(x) denote the distribution of the i-th highest bidder’s joint bid from these bidders















Now consider the partial derivatives at (b∗
1,b ∗







2) < 0 so that with value (v1,v 1) t h eb e s tr e s p o n s es e c o n db i db2
5Since the other bidders are bidding the same amount on both units, bidder 1’s highest bid cannot
be the second highest bid in the auction.
11is strictly less than b∗
2. Thus it is enough to show that the best response bids at (v,v)
are always equal.
Suppose not, and that for some (v,v) the best response bids b1 and b2 satisfy b1 >b 2.
Then it must be the case that
d
db
(v − b)H2(b)|b=b1 =0and
d
db








for some b>0,o r ,e q u i v a l e n t l yH1(b)h2(b) − H2(b)h1(b) ≥ 0 for some b>0.
Let G(·) denote the joint (bundle-) bid for a unit by bidders 2,..,n,a n dg(·) the




n−1(n − 1)(n − 2)G(b)
n−3(1 − G(b))g(b)
−(G(b)
n−1 +( n − 1)G(b)
n−2(1 − G(b)))(n − 1)G(b)
n−2g(b)
Clearly, for n =2the expression is negative for all b>0.I fn ≥ 3 it is equal to
(n − 1)G(b)
2n−4[(n − 2) − (n − 2)G(b) − G(b) − (n − 1) + (n − 1)G(b)]g(b)
= −(n − 1)G(b)
2n−4g(b)
< 0
for all b>0. In other words, inequality (1) cannot be satisﬁed for any b>0 giving a
contradiction to our hypothesis. Therefore, for all value pairs (v,v) the bids must be
equal which implies that for all values the best response bids must be equal.
Low-bid uniform-price auction. Again, suppose that bidders 2,...,n are bundle-bidding.
Let H1(x) and H2(x) denote the the probability distribution of the bids of the highest
and the second highest of these bidders. If bidder 1 bids b1 and b2 satisfying b1 ≥ b2,t h e
12expected payoﬀ is equal to
b2 R
0
(v1 + v2 − 2x)h1(x)dx +
b1 R
b2
(v1 − x)h1(x)dx +( v1 − b1)(H2(b1) − H1(b1))
The derivative with respect to b1 is (v1−b1)h2(b1)−(H2(b1)−H1(b1)) which is negative at
b1 = v1. The derivative with respect to b2 is (v2 −b2)h1(b2) which is positive for b2 <v 2.
This implies that a bundle-bid is a best response to other bidders bundle-bidding.
High-bid uniform-price auction. If bidders 2,..,n bundle-bid then at a value (v,v) bidder
1’s expected payoﬀ is
b2 R
0
(v + v − 2x)h1(x)dx +
b1 R
b2
(v − x)h2(x)dx +( v − b2)(H2(b2) − H1(b2))
where H1 and H2 are deﬁned the same way as in the low-bid uniform-price auction.
The derivative with respect to b1 is (v − b1)h2(b1) which is positive for all b1 <v .T h e
derivative with respect to b2 is (v − b2)h1(b2) − (H2(b2) − H1(b2)) which is negative at
b2 = v. Thus when the other bidders are bundle-bidding, at value (v,v) the best response
is not a bundle-bid. Hence there is no bundle-bidding equilibrium. ¥
13